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Abstract  
 
Burial disputes are something of a novelty in New Zealand. Most are resolved amicably by 
those with ties to the deceased. The exception to has been the long-running case of 
Takamore v Clarke, the matter finally being resolved by the Supreme Court this year. 
Burial disputes raise fundamental issues of religious and cultural identity (including 
tikanga Māori), personhood, and the meaning of family. Despite their rarity in New 
Zealand, the response of the law in resolving such disputes should “fit the fuss”, having 
regard to the context in which they arise. This essay begins by discussing the form of 
resolution advocated for by the majority and minority in Takamore. Their respective 
approaches are essentially the same, especially with regards to tikanga Māori. This is one 
of Court intervention coupled with a merits-based assessment of the dispute. However the 
Court failed to apprehend there was no pressing need for burial, prior to creating a  
solution of general application. The experience of comparable jurisdictions, where speedy 
resolution has been necessary (such as Australia) demonstrates that the role of the Court 
applying such a test in burial disputes is misconceived. Rather than providing “justice” 
for the parties concerned, merits-based resolution produces unfair and unconvincing 
outcomes. The more just response is to ensure the parties never get to Court, via 
mediation. Insofar as agreement is not possible, the role of the Court should be 
supervisory in the application of a prescriptive test emphasising expediency and ensuring 
the dispute is resolved out of Court.  
 
Keywords: burial disputes, tikanga Māori, merits-based assessment, Court intervention, mediation, 
prescriptive test 
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I Introduction 
 
When a person dies, happily most disputes as to location and manner of disposal of their 
remains  are resolved expediently and amicably outside of litigation, or do not arise in the 
first place.1 In New Zealand this is illustrated by the lack of case law on how burial 
disputes are to be resolved.2 Situations do-arise-where-parties-to-such-disputes-are-unable-
to-resolve-the-matter-without-third-party-assistance.-This-has-been-the-case-in-the-
protracted-burial-dispute in Takamore v Clarke (“Takamore”). Last year, the Supreme-
Court-unanimously-dismissed the-appeal-of-Josephine-Takamore-(the “appellant”)3 in-
her-claim-that-she-had-the-ultimate right to dispose of her deceased brothers remains 
(James Takamore “the deceased”).4 His partner Denise Clarke (the “respondent”) was 
successful in having her original claim to the High-Court-vindicated,5 allowing-her to-
decide-the-place of burial.6 However the majority (Tipping, McGrath, and Blanchard JJ)7 
and minority (Elias CJ, William Young J) differed on the reasons the appeal should be 
allowed.8 As this case demonstrates, amicable inter-parties resolution of burial disputes is 
not always possible.9 A legal solution is needed.10 In an area of law which impacts on the 
feelings, human rights, and cultural practices of parties to the conflict, any legal response 
must be analytically sound, convincing, and consistent with pertinent policy objectives.11  
The focus of this paper will be on analysing the respective approaches of majority and 
minority in resolving this case, with reference to tikanga Māori (“tikanga”) as an 
illustration of how they would-work in practice. Closer-analysis (again with reference to 
tikanga) demonstrates there is-no-material-difference in their-approaches, contrary to 
judicial opinion in the case.12 Both-majority and-minority resolve this case applying a 
“merits-based” approach. It will then be argued that counter-intuitively, Court imposed 
                                                        
1 Takamore v Clarke [2012] NZSC 116, at [2], [10]. For brevities sake, such disputes will be referred to as 
“burial disputes” (though this is intended to include other forms of disposal such as cremation).  
2 Ibid at [62], [112]-[120], Murdoch v Rhind [1945] NZLR 425 (SC), Tapora v Tapora CA206/96, 28 August 
1996.  
3 See Clarke v Takamore [2010] 2 NZLR 525 (HC) at [18], Takamore v Clarke [2011] NZCA 587, [2012] 1 
NZLR 5 at [7], Takamore v Clarke (SC), above n 1, at [3]-[4].  
4 At [108], [170], [175].  
5 Clarke v Takamore [2010] 2 NZLR 525 (HC).  
6 At [107].  
7 At [154] and [160] per Tipping, McGrath and Blanchard JJ.  
8 At [90] per Elias CJ, [175], [214] per William Young J.  
9 Takamore v Clarke (CA), above n 3, at [6].  
10 Calma v Sesar (1992) 106 FLR 446 (NTSC) at 452.  
11 At [1].  
12 At [213].  
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resolution coupled with a merits-based test does not produce more “just” outcomes in 
burial disputes. This can be demonstrated with reference to the application of tikanga (or 
other cultural beliefs) in resolving burial disputes. In this sense tikanga is just one example 
of the systematic problems arising in the application of a merits-based approach. Such 
problems are illustrated by developments in a number of Australian decisions, where 
significantly more case law has been generated. A-detailed-analysis-of-reform-is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but a tentative solution could be-a-mandatory-mediation regime for 
burial disputes. The ultimate-argument is-that, by their very-nature, burial disputes are not 
amenable to just resolution in the sense that a range of options are often open. Requiring 
the law-to-satisfy-such-a criterion is unmerited, and other policy factors should be 
determinative in this context. 
II The Resolution of Burial Disputes Under Takamore  
A Factual Background  
 
The deceased passed away on the 17 August 2007 in Christchurch.13 He was born in 1952, 
Waioweka, south of Opotiki, in the Bay of Plenty. His whānau’s marae was Kutarere, a Te 
Upokerehe (hapū) marae14 governed by Tūhoe tikanga.15 The deceased’s teenage and early 
adult years were spent in his tribal homelands and in close contact with his family, 
however sometime prior to1985 he began seeing the respondent (who was from 
Christchurch).16 In 1985 they had their first child.17 The respondent then began to miss her 
family in Christchurch, and so returned with their child. The deceased followed her and 
they remained settled in Christchurch until his death.  
During his time in Christchurch the deceased’s contact with his family from Kutarere was 
infrequent, and he only visited his family twice prior to his death.18 There was also 
evidence that the deceased had turned his back on his cultural heritage,19 though the High 
Court finding to this effect was overturned by the majority of the Court of Appeal20 and 
                                                        
13Takamore v Clarke (SC), above n 1, at [13].  
14 Clarke v Takamore (HC), above n 3, at [10].  
15 Ibid at [10]-[11].  
16 At [13].  
17 Ibid.  
18 At [14].  
19 At [14]-[16], [88].  
20 Takamore v Clark (CA), above n 3, at [156]-[158] per Glazebrook and Wild JJ, compare at [267] per 
Chambers J.  
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unanimously in the Supreme Court.21 His body remained at a local marae in Christchurch, 
pending funeral and burial there.22 However his northern relatives arrived and laid claim to 
his body, arguing he should be returned to the Bay of Plenty and buried there.23 A heated 
discussion ensued, with neither party acquiescing to the others claim.  
The next day, the deceased’s mother called to tell the respondent she and her family were 
waiting at the marae for her to return-so-the-discussions-could-resume,24 however-the 
respondent was unwilling to return, fearing-for-the-safety-of-herself-and her-children.25 
They-subsequently-uplifted-the-deceased’s-remains-and-took-them-back-to be-buried-at-
the-Kutarere-Marae.26 The respondent obtained an interim injunction restraining the-burial 
of the-deceased, and-requiring-the-police-to-take-his-remains-into custody pending 
resolution.27 However-the-police-did-not-attempt to serve the order.28 Consequently the 
deceased’s body was interred at Kutarere and has remained there during the subsequent 
litigation. This had a significant impact on how the case was dealt with procedurally, as 
there was no pressure in terms of-ensuring the case was dealt with speedily. This impacted 
on how quickly the matter has been resolved. The respondent subsequently issued 
proceedings in the High Court seeking an order allowing her to disinter the deceased’s 
remains and deal with them as she saw fit.29 
B Tikanga  
 
Tikanga will play an important part later in this paper, when comparing the differences 
between the majority and minority approach to resolution of burial disputes, and also in 
illustrating the difficulties of a merits-based test. It is therefore necessary to define it. 
However the present case demonstrates that defining tikanga is not overly helpful in the 
sense that the phrase is more illustrative than definitive.30 Different potential meanings 
                                                        
21 Takamore v Clarke (SC), above n 1, at [17] per Elias CJ, at [110] per Tipping, McGrath and Blanchard JJ.  
22 Takamore v Clarke (HC), above n 3, at [2].  
23 Ibid at [3].  
24 Takamore v Clarke (CA), above n 3, at [42]. 
25 Ibid.  
26 At [43].  
27 Clarke v Takamore (HC), above n 3, at [6].  
28 Ibid. The body had not been interred at the time of the Police arrived to serve the order, however it seems 
likely the officers entrusted with serving the order were hesitant to do so because this could have resulted in 
a physical altercation with members of the deceased’s family and others present at the funeral (as the 
injunction required the Police to take the body into their custody).  
29 Ibid at [9].  
30 Fiona Wright ““Tikanga Māori” What is it doing in New Zealand law?” (LLM Research Paper, Law, 
Religion and Values (Laws 527), Victoria University of Wellington, 2006) at 24.  
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indicate what kind of things tikanga encapsulates (e.g. rules, values, practices, polite 
behaviour), but do not specify what their content is. In this case (though not necessarily 
every burial dispute)31 the relevant features of the burial tikanga were well documented 
and subject of extensive expert testimony.32 This makes it unnecessary to carry out a 
detailed discussion of the phrase. For present purposes a working definition is provided in 
the Law Commission paper “Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law” as “...a 
body of rules and values developed by Māori to govern themselves – the Māori way of 
doing things.”33 The key principles of Tūhoe tikanga in the present case were summarised 
by counsel for the appellant, in the High Court decision.34  
C The Majority Position  
1 Introduction  
 
In this part of the paper it is argued that there is no material difference between the 
majority and minority approach in resolving burial disputes; as they both provide the Court 
decides which party has the best claim. William Young J, in concurring with Elias CJ, 
stated that “[the Chief Justice’s approach] does, however, involve a substantial concession 
to custom in that it precludes any single participant (who may not be a family member) 
determining the outcome.”35 A closer analysis of the Supreme Court’s respective 
approaches reveals this conclusion is false.  
Both majority and minority were heavily influenced by the percieved importance of 
creating a legal framework which allows for Court supervision of burial decisions; whether 
the first decision is made by the deceased’s personal representative, or someone else. 
Additionally they wished to ensure such supervision was carried out in a manner which 
allowed a burial decision to be substituted if the Court thought it was incorrect, as opposed 
to a higher threshold for intervention.  
The overriding policy factor the Court considered to justify some form of review right (and 
the application of a merits-based test) in burial disputes was the importance of maintaining 
the “...flexibility to respond to the justice of the case.”36 This can be seen expressly in the 
                                                        
31 See Reece v Little [2009] WASC 30 at [72]-[74].  
32 Clarke v Takamore (HC), above n 3, at [57], Takamore v Clarke (CA), above n 3, at [58]-[92].  
33 Law Commission Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law (NZLC SP9, 2001) at 73.  
34 Takamore v Clarke (HC), above n 3, at [57].  
35 At [213].  
36 At [75]. 
8 
 
minority’s judgment.37 And it can also been seen through the majority’s unwillingness to 
accept burial decisions of personal representatives were to be reviewed in accordance with 
equitable jurisdiction of the High Court  to review a trustee’s decision.38 Combined, this 
reflects the Court’s concern that burial disputes should be resolved in accordance with 
their merits.39 Later in the paper it will be argued that a merits-based test is inappropriate, 
despite the importance of resolving such disputes fairly.  
2 Personal representative as first decider  
 
 
Two common themes can be distilled from the majority and minority approaches: firstly 
the importance of Court review, and secondly ensuring the nature of such review allows 
the Court to intervene if it disagrees with the decision of the personal representative or 
other person who may have made burial arrangements. According to the majority, burial 
disputes are resolved in accordance with the common law framework governing the rights 
and obligations of executors to a deceased person’s estate.40 In the event of an intestacy, 
the administrator is in the same position as the executor.41 The administrator is appointed 
in accordance with the priority in favour of those with a beneficial interest in the 
deceased’s estate (due to succession), as set out in the High Court Rules and the 
Administration Act 1968.42 However the High Court has an overriding discretion to grant 
another person letters of administration.43 The executor was traditionally said to have the 
duty and right to dispose of the deceased’s remains, in the sense that they have the ultimate 
right to decide the manner and location of disposal, but also a duty to ensure that disposal 
occurred.44 This is conceived by William Young J as the stronger version of the “first 
decider” rule, whereby the executor is the paramount decision-maker with regards to 
disposal, and this is not subject to appeal or any other form of review.45  
Under such an approach the significance of tikanga (and other relevant factors, such as 
spiritual beliefs) would be dependent on the views of the executor or administrator, as in 
                                                        
37 Ibid.  
38 At [162].  
39 At [75]-[86] per Elias CJ, at [156] per Tipping, McGrath and Blanchard JJ.  
40 Takamore v Clarke (SC), above n 1, [112]-[120].  
41 At [145], [171].  
42 Administration Act 1968, s 77, High Court Rules, r 27.35(3)-(4).  
43 Section 6, Takamore v Clarke (SC), above n 1, at [148], Burrows v HM Coroner for Preston [2008] 2 FLR 
1225 (QB) at [17].  
44 Ibid, Williams v Williams (1882) 20 ChD 659. 
45 At [172].  
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lieu of any right of appeal their view on the matter is determinative. As this would mean 
recognition and protection of tikanga turned on the whims of the particular personal 
representative (as there is no ability for an aggrieved party seek review of the decision), it 
is difficult to conceive how such a rule could ever sufficiently ensure the decision is made 
with proper reference to tikanga. More generally there would be no appellate function for 
the Courts, to ensure that the personal representative reached the “correct” decision.  
3 A less absolute form of the first decider rule  
 
 
Consequently, the majority adopts a weaker form of the first decider rule. The decision of 
the deceased’s personal representative stands unless successfully challenged in the High 
Court.46 Importantly the first decider rule is only engaged where the family of the deceased 
is unable to reach a decision as to disposal,47 and secondly review (where sought) would 
proceed largely on the basis of a de novo rehearing48 of the personal representatives 
decision, with perhaps no, or little deference being paid to their original decision.49 This is 
to be distinguished from a stricter review approach, such as requiring the personal 
representative to have acted in bad faith or ultra vires.50 The Court may intervene where, 
having regard to all the relevant circumstances (such as spiritual and cultural practices and 
beliefs, and other family and personal interests), it believes the decision made by the 
personal representative was not appropriate.51 The demonstrates the first theme noted 
earlier, the majority was concerned with establishing a supervisory role of the Court to 
ensure those aggrieved with burial decisions had the means to challenge them. Hence it 
adopts a weaker form of the first decider rule, though admittedly this was also supported 
by developments in comparable jurisdictions rather than solely policy considerations.52 
 
 
                                                        
46 At [154], [160].  
47 Ibid.  
48 Takamore v Clarke (SC), above  n 1, at [172], Andrew Beck Principles of Civil Procedure (3rd ed, 
Brookers, Wellington, 2012) at 235, Shotover Gorge Jet Boats Ltd v Jamieson [1987] 1 NZLR 437 (CA).   
49At [160]-[162].  
50 Law Commission Court Jurisdiction, Trading Trusts and Other Issues: Review of the Law of Trusts 
(NZLC IP5, 2011) 10-13.  
51 Takamore v Clarke (SC), above n 1, at [162].  
52 At [121]-[142].  
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4 Contrast: a more stringent form of review in equity  
 
 
The majority’s approach is in contrast from the standard of review advocated for by 
counsel for the respondent.53 Its dismissal of such an approach highlights a key 
consideration which underlies its decision; that the supervisory role of the Court needed to 
be unimpeded by a legal test which creates a heightened threshold to be met before the 
decision of the personal representative will be set aside. This is the second of the two 
discussed themes. Counsel made reference to the source of the power of review of an 
executor’s decision as to burial being equity and therefore review would be via the High 
Court’s supervisory jurisdiction of executors/administrators as trustees of the deceased’s 
estate.54 The majority dismissed the argument that the source of the High Court’s review 
jurisdiction of burial decision is equity.55  The correctness of such a decision will not be 
considered, rather its significance for present purposes demonstrates the majority was 
seized of alternatives to a de novo rehearing but dismissed them because of its concern that 
burial disputes be resolved based on their merits.  
 
Briefly, if the personal representatives decision was required to be reviewed in accordance 
with principles governing the review of the exercise of a trustee’s discretionary power,56 
intervention would only be justified where it could be shown the trustee had acted in bad 
faith or ultra vires.57 The two most pertinent sub-grounds of “bad faith” are a failure to 
take into account, understand, or give genuine and honest consideration to relevant 
matters, or conversely, take into account irrelevant matters, and where this amounted to a 
breach of a fiduciary obligation.58 The weight to be given to such factors would seem to be 
up to the trustee, recent New Zealand decisions hold that a trustee’s decision cannot be 
reviewed because they are “unreasonable” (in the Wednesbury sense).59 
                                                        
53 At [162].  
54 At [74].  
55 Ibid.  
56 Noel C Kelly and others Garrow and Kelly Law of Trusts and Trustees (6th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 
2005) at 512.  
57 Gailey v Gordon [2003] 2 NZLR 192 (HC) at [83]. 
58 See Noel C Kelly, above n 56, at 516-519 and Law Commission, above n 50, at 12,  compare Re Hasting-
Bass [1974] 2 All ER 193 and Futter v Futter [2011] EWCA Civ 197. 
59 For the affirmative view see Craddock v Crowhen (1995) 1 NZSC 40,331 at 12, Wrightson Ltd v Fletcher 
Challenge Nominees Ltd (1998) 1 NZSC 40,388, Re The Motorola Superannuation Fund [2001] 3 NZLR 50 
(HC), compare with Gailey v Gordon, above n 57, at [89], Noel C Kelly, above n 56, at 521-522. See also 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1. 
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Even if a personal representative failed to take into account a relevant matter the party 
seeking to review the decision would need to show a breach of the personal 
representative’s fiduciary obligations. Traditional fiduciary obligations (which focus on 
the personal representatives role in disposing of the deceased’s estate) imposed on trustees 
do not correlate with the discretionary power of a personal representative to decide where 
the deceased is buried.60  If the trustee did take the relevant factor into account, then the 
weight it was given is not a ground for challenge under recent authority. It is therefore 
difficult to ever envisage a scenario where failure to have regard to a relevant factor (or 
regard to an irrelevant factor) would allow the representatives decision to be successfully 
challenged. The likely remedy would be to remit the decision back to the trustee to make 
again, having regard to the relevant factor. Stakeholders in the dispute would be left with 
no effective remedy, as the personal representative might reach the same decision again 
after considering the relevant factor (or ignoring the irrelevant one). The reasonableness of 
the decision would be unable to be challenged.  
 
Such an approach is the antithesis of a merits-based test, which allows the Court to make 
its own decision based on all the circumstances. In dismissing such an approach, the 
majority clearly wished to avoid a situation where Court review was restricted, so as to 
allow it to ensure burial disputes are justly resolved in accordance with their merits.61  
D The Minority Approach  
1 A similar approach... 
 
The Chief Justice, along with William Young J, disagreed with the majority on their 
interpretation of relevant case law governing a personal representative’s right as the first 
decider.62 They thought that personal representatives did not have a first decider role, and 
because of the lacuna their approach creates the Chief Justice determines that the High 
Court has jurisdiction to resolve burial disputes via its inherent jurisdiction. Executors and 
other family members of the deceased have the “privilege” of burial, which means in lieu 
                                                        
60 Takamore v Clarke (SC), above n 1, at [74]. See N Richardson Nevill’s Law of Trusts, Wills and 
Administration (10th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2010) at 217-252.  
61 At [162].  
62 At [8], [90] per Elias CJ, at [173], [214] per William Young J.  
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of dispute they have sufficient authority to dispose of the deceased remains.63 The inherent 
jurisdiction of the High Court can be properly invoked where the dispute is unable to be 
settled outside of Court, such as through familial discussion or tikanga.64  
In exercising its inherent jurisdiction, the minority’s approach in resolving burial disputes 
is very similar to the majorities in that it provides for ultimate determination by the High 
Court.65 Those with standing can invoke the inherent jurisdiction, and the High Court will 
determine the matter with reference to the wider circumstances of the case,66 including 
personal relationships the deceased had and their closeness,67 cultural and spiritual 
values,68 and other relevant factors. The common themes of Court imposed resolution and 
merits-based test can be seen in the minorities approach also.  
2 But greater deference to tikanga? 
 
William Young J disagreed with the conclusion that the majority and minority approaches 
treated tikanga in a similar fashion.69 This was because minority approach provided that no 
one person has a definitive say in what happens to the remains of the deceased (prior to 
invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court), the minority’s approach was argued 
by William Young J to better reflect the Tūhoe burial tikanga.70 The minority approach 
was said to reflect one of its values, that is, the resolution of burial disputes are not a 
decision for one person to make, but rather a collective decision in which the views of no 
one person are determinative.71 The majority approach allows one person to resolve the 
dispute; the personal representative of the deceased. Tikanga, in contrast, requires such 
decisions to be made with reference to the whānau pani of the deceased.72 In the event of 
an impasse, a wider circle can be engaged with the aim of resolving the dispute 
(particularly those with cultural expertise).73 The decision is a collective one rather than 
for a particular individual.  
                                                        
63 At [90].  
64 At [91].  
65 At [173].  
66 At [90].  
67 At [92].  
68 At [94]. 
69 At [213].    
70 Ibid.   
71 Clarke v Takamore (HC), above n 3, at [57]  
72 Bereaved relatives.  
73 Takamore v Clarke (CA), above n 3, at [64]-[65].  
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To an extent this is a misnomer, as Tūhoe tikanga does provide for an ultimate decision-
maker. It provides a set of values through which the merits of party’s claims can be 
assessed objectively (such as where the deceased’s placenta was buried).74 One party 
might be pressured into acquiescing to another’s decision because, based on these 
criterion, they have an objectively “weaker” claim. Tikanga therefore envisages that a 
collective decision (i.e. one everyone agrees to) might not always be possible. Another 
example of this is the ability of one party to take the deceased’s remains through force or 
stealth.75 What tikanga does allow for, is a process of wider consultation and values-based 
assessment of claimants burial wishes. It cannot sensibly guarantee that everyone will be 
happy with the ultimate decision or avoid the possibility that one person’s decision  
Confusingly William Young J’s criticism of the majority approach seems to be that it fails 
to accommodate the latter point, that is it prescribes an ultimate decision-maker in the form 
of a personal representative.76 But Tūhoe tikanga must also deal with the situation where 
participants are unable to agree, and it provides for a process of debate and discussion to 
determine who this person should be, or alternatively allows one party to unilaterally seize 
the remains. This is the crux of the issue in the case – who ultimately gets to decide where 
the remains are buried? The key difference between majority and tikanga is how this is 
determined.  Thus the more valid criticism, is the manner in which the majority approach 
determines who the ultimate decider is (i.e. who is the executor or administrator). This is 
in contrast to the process of wider consultation, debate, and merits-based assessment of 
respective claims required by tikanga. A closer reading of the respective approaches in this 
case demonstrates that, neither provides for tikanga prior to Court resolution in the sense 
just described.  
Like the minority approach with respect to Court intervention,77 the first decider rule is 
only engaged where the family of the deceased is unable to agree.78 The first decider rule 
will only allow the personal representative to make a binding decision where familial 
resolution is not possible. This means that, under both approaches, the family of the 
deceased have considerable leeway to resolve the dispute themselves, in accordance with 
tikanga or some other approach. If this fails, the first decider rule is engaged. As with the 
                                                        
74 Clarke v Takamore (HC), above n 3, at [57]. 
75 Ibid.  
76 Takamore v Clarke (SC), above n 1, at [213]. 
77 At [90].  
78 At [154].  
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majority approach, the minority also does not provide for tikanga prior to Court 
resolution.79  
A number of persons have the “privilege of burial”. But the Chief Justice doesn’t specify 
the process or values which are to be brought to bear when determining which one of these 
persons has the best claim if they are in disagreement as to what is to happen to the 
deceased’s remains. There is no process; the minority approach creates a free for all. 
Where dispute does arise seemingly those with the privilege are not permitted to exercise 
it,80 but the minority does not specify what the consequences would be if the party did 
proceed to bury the deceased in the absence of consent of other privilege-holders. By 
inference, there are none, as the facts of this very case would seem to indicate. 
Conclusively, the minority approach does not provide for or incentivise adherence to a 
particular process or set of values prior to Court resolution. There is no difference between 
either approach in terms of tikanga, the former provides for pre-Court resolution, the latter 
does not.  
3 Is the minorities test for Court intervention different to the majorities?  
 
One criticism Elias CJ made of the majorities approach was that it amounted to a “rule of 
law” or prescriptive based approach to resolving burial disputes.81 This distinction 
between a merits-based and a prescriptive based test is that the former resolves burial 
disputes based on the wider circumstances of the deceased’s life and interested parties. 
Competing claims and factors are weighed (such as the importance of particular 
relationships, spiritual, and cultural practices) with the ultimate decision being made from 
the premise that there is one “normatively” correct outcome.  
 
A prescriptive test or “rule of law approach” creates some form of rule (whether hard or 
rebuttable) which disposes of the dispute, usually characterised by lack of consideration of 
the merits of the disputes and a greater level of certainty prior to initiating proceedings.82 
A paradigm example is the hard form of first decider rule,83 and another is statutory 
                                                        
79 At [90]-[91] per Elias CJ.  
80 At [90].  
81 At [80]-[86]. 
82 At [80]. For examples of the former and latter see Calma v Sesar, above n 10 at 452,  Meier v Bell SC 
Victoria BC9700457, 3 March 1997 at 10, compare Jones v Dodd [1999] SASC 125, at [53]-[55], Dodd v 
Jones [1999] SASC 458  at [30]-[32]. 
83 At [174]-[175].  
15 
 
regimes which prescribe that certain blood relatives have a presumptive right to dispose of 
the deceased’s remains.84 It is questionable that, when viewed holistically (i.e. the role of 
the personal representative as first decider in conjunction with the capacity for Court 
review) the majority approach is really a prescriptive one, especially considering the 
review of the personal representative’s decision occurs de novo. In this sense the Chief 
Justice was incorrect to say that the majority approach was a prescriptive one. The 
proposition that the majority and minority approach take a different approach to tikanga 
(or the resolution of burial disputes more generally) is categorically rejected. It is 
important to remember this when considering the efficacy of a merits-based approach: the 
majority and minority both apply a merits-based approach.  
III Burial Dispute Resolution Under Takamore: A Critique  
A Introduction 
 
The next part of this paper will begin from the premise that both the majority and minority 
approach start from the same position when resolving burial disputes. The efficacy of a 
merits-based test will be considered. This will be done with reference to tikanga, as a 
useful illustration of some of the difficulties that might arise in the application of such a 
test. The Chief Justice was well seized of issues arising from merits-based test, but did not 
think that these justified an alternative rules based approach.85 This position is contested, 
an in-depth analysis of merits-based test in the context of burial disputes demonstrates that 
such a test is unable to achieve its rationale; the just resolution of such disputes. In 
Australia there has been significantly more case law in resolving burial disputes, applying 
a merits-based test.86 With reference to these decisions it will be argued that a merits-based 
test (and the role of the Court in applying such a test) raises a number of insurmountable 
difficulties, and that an alternative means of resolving burial disputes should be adopted in 
New Zealand.  
B Context and Speedy Burial  
 
                                                        
84 Cremation, Interment and Funeral Services Act BC 2004 c 35, s 5. 
85 At [80]-[86] per Elias CJ, [138] per Tipping, McGrath and Blanchard JJ.  
86 Smith v Tamworh City Council (1997) 41 NSWLR 680, Roaslind Atherton “Who owns your body?” 
(2003) 77 ALJ 178 at184-189, Calma v Sesar, above n 10, at 452, Meier v Bell, above n 82, at 5, Dodd v 
Jones, above n 82, at [30]-[31], Jones v Dodd, above n 82, at [51].  
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It is important to note the context in which burial dispute are resolved, as this highlights a 
significant issue with a merits-based test. Understandably in most cultures and societies, 
there is an emphasis on ensuring the deceased is buried quickly after death.87 This is an 
expression of an important principle; that is speedy burial. Burial is integrally tied up with 
the grieving process, and a delayed burial results in lack of closure for loved ones of the 
deceased and compounds their suffering further.88 The natural correlation is that burial 
disputes, where litigated must be resolved quickly, in order to save the feelings of those 
involved.89  
This feature’s importance is reflected in the way Courts have been unwilling to subject 
such disputes to full hearings or even reserve their decisions, and the consequential 
delays.90 As a theme, speedy resolution of burial disputes has been noted as an important 
concern in New Zealand, despite our lack of case law in this area.91 Additionally, it can be 
seen in the majority’s refusal to require the deceased’s personal representative to carry out 
a consultation process with interested parties.92 This conclusively demonstrates that a key 
feature when resolving burial disputes is the importance of ensuring that such resolution 
occurs quickly. Also important to note, this is the paramouncy of a such a principle, which 
which takes precedence over other important policy considerations, such as subjecting 
burial disputes to fuller procedural requirements.  
The next point to note is that, because of the unique facts of the present case, the decision 
was not required to be disposed of quickly. This is because the deceased remains were not 
held in state prior to the dispute, which meant there was no pressing need to ensure that he 
was properly buried.93 And this resulted from the forced taking of the deceased’s remains, 
and the consequent removal to the North Island for burial.94 General practice in burial 
disputes in Australia is that reliance is placed on the parties not to make burial 
arrangements until the matter has been determined by the Court,95 but invariably in some 
                                                        
87 Takamore v Clarke (SC), above n 1, at [86], Jones v Dodd, above n 82, at [40].  
88 Ugle v Bowra [2007] WASC 82 at [1].  
89 Ibid.  
90 Dodd v Jones, above n 82, at [5]-[6]. Jones v Dodd, above n 82, at[12], Mourish v Wynee [2009] WASC 
85 at [4], Keller v Keller [2007] VSC 118 at [4], [9], Ugle v Bowra, above n 88, at [1], [3], Reece v Little, 
above n 31, at [16], [23].  
91 Murdoch v Rhind, above n 2, at 426.  
92 At [156].  
93 Clarke v Takamore (HC), n 3, at [6]-[7].  
94 Takamore v Clarke (SC), n 1, at [19].  
95 Meier v Bell, above n 82, at 1, Jones v Dodd, above n 82, at [1]-[8]. 
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cases a free for all will eventuate. This is when interim injunctions become a useful tool to 
prevent one party attempting to pre-determine the outcome of the dispute.96  
 The New Zealand Police refused to serve the interim injunction obtained by the 
respondent,97 which meant that when the Takamore whānau buried the deceased they were 
neither in contempt of court, nor required to disinter the body and give up custody to the 
Police to purge their contempt.98 The terms of the order required that the Police to restrain 
the burial of the deceased.99 The order had no legal effect prior to service100 or being 
brought to the attention of non-parties, and became nugatory once burial had occurred. It 
was overtaken by the subsequent litigation as well as the fact the injunction was aimed at 
restraining burial rather than requiring disinterment.101 The deceased was buried, and it is 
in this state he remained for the subsequent litigation. And as he had been buried there was 
no perceived need (especially judicial) to ensure the matter was quickly disposed of.102 
Finally, this had a significant impact on the application of a merits-based approach; it 
meant the Court had considerably more time to fully resolve the matter.  
This can be seen in the sheer length of time the Takamore dispute has ensued, with 
proceedings commenced in August 2007 by the respondent,103 and the appeal to the 
Supreme Court being disposed of on 18 December 2012.104 Hearings in this case 
(especially in the High Court, where the lengthiest aspect of hearings occurred, the calling 
of evidence)105 seem to sit in the middle range of potential hearing times.106 More 
                                                        
96 Calma v Sesar, above n 10, at 447-448, Leeburn v Derndorfer [2004] VSC 172 at [6], Mourish v Wynee, 
above n 90, at [2]. Mankletow v Public Trustee [2001] WASC 290 at [1].  
97 High Court Rules, r 6.1, see Footnote 28.  
98 High Court Rules, rr 7.48, 17.3, 17.84, 17.86, Soljan v Spencer [1984] 1 NLZR 618 (CA).   
99 Takamore v Clarke, above n 3, at [6].  
100 Footnote 98.  
101 Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No.2) [1992] 2 QB 213 at 239, Siemer v Solicitor-General [2013] 
NZSC 68.   
102 This can be seen in the length of time between hearing and when the judgments of the respective Courts 
came out, especially at the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court levels, all three decisions being reserved. The 
High Court decision came out 14 days after the hearing, 293 days for the Court of Appeal and 153 for the 
Supreme Court. 293 and 153 days, would be seen as incredibly an incredibly lengthy period for the deceased 
body to remain unburied (which of course didn’t occur in this case), and this is demonstrated by general 
practice in Australia where the turnaround of decisions is much quicker, for example see Mankletow v Public 
Trustee, above n 96 (one day),  AB v CD [2007] NSWSC 1474 (four days),  Burrows v Cramley [2002] 
WASC 47 (1 day),  Keller v Keller, above n 90 (one day),  Doherty v Doherty [2006] QSC 257 (31 days).  
103 Clarke v Takamore (HC), above n 3, at [6].  
104 Takamore v Clarke (SC), above n 1.  
105 The hearing in the High Court went for three days, with the appeal to the Court of Appeal being heard in 
one, and the Supreme Court appeal over two.  
106 For cases where the matter was heard over one day see Ugle v Bowra, above n 88, Meier v Bell, above n 
82, Leeburn v Derndeorfer, above n 96,  Jones v Dodd, above n 82, though compare Dodd v Jones, above n 
18 
 
importantly, the time between hearing and decisions demonstrates that the Courts had 
ample time to consider the matter fully; both in terms of the evidence that was called and 
time to produce a fully-reasoned and cogent judgment.107 A stark contrast can be drawn 
between the timeframe for resolution in Takamore and the Western Australian decision in 
Ugle, where the matter was resolved within two days of commencing the proceedings 
because of the pressing need to ensure burial.108  
Neither the majority nor minority seems to have apprehended that Takamore differed to 
most burial disputes in the sense that speedy resolution was not required.109 The majority 
stresses that the first decider approach provided for more “prompt decisions” where a 
burial dispute arises, and thereby highlights their view that expeditious burial is a positive 
aspect of their approach.110 But there is only limited assessment of how this interrelated 
with a merits-based approach to reviewing the decision of the deceased’s personal 
representative.111 With regards to the minority, Elias CJ notes that burial disputes will 
generally have to be resolved quickly, but fails to note that this was not an issue in the 
present case.112 The impact of the requirement for a speedy burial was not considered 
before the Court handed down a rule which would mostly apply to disputes that needed to 
be resolved much more quickly.  The consequences of this will now be considered.  
C The Corollary of a Speedy Burial  
1 Resolving factual controversies  
 
The corollary of resolving burial disputes quickly is the impact on the nature of the 
evidence which can be called. Because of the short amount of time to resolve the matter, 
parties generally give evidence by way of affidavit with no cross-examination of 
deponents.113 Such affidavits usually take the forms of assertions, and counter-assertions 
                                                                                                                                                                       
82 (four days),  Calma v Sesar, above n 10 (four days),  Reece v Little, above n 31 (two days),  Mourish v 
Wynne, above n 90 (3 days),  Mankletow  v The Public Trustee above n 96 (2 days).  
107 Footnote 102.  
108 Ugle v Bowra, above n 88.  
109 Takamore v Clarke (SC), above n 1, at [7]-[12], [75]-[86] per Elias CJ, at [131]-[138], [153]. [156]-[157], 
[162] per Tipping, McGrath and Blanchard JJ, at [207] per William Young J.  
110 At [162].  
111 At [138].  
112 At [86].  
113 Dodd v Jones, above n 82, at [4], Reece v Little, above n 31, at [8]-[15], Dow v Hoskins [2003] VSC 206 
at [5], Jones v Dodd, above n 82, at 330, Mourish v Wynee, above n 90, at [3]-[4], Doherty v Doherty, above 
n 102, at [12], Mankletow v Public Trustee, above n  96, at [6]-[11] Ugle v Bowra, above n 88, at [1], [3]-[5], 
Keller v Keller, above n 90, at [1], [4], [15].  
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favourable to the party’s case,114 and includes evidence such as the deceased’s preference 
as to burial,115 evidence of the parties relationship with the deceased, 116 or the 
deceased’s/party’s cultural/spiritual beliefs, and evidence of historical family disputes.117 It 
is inevitable that in such circumstances that factual controversies. These types of evidence 
are not readily verifiable.118 Further there is no incentive for parties to be conservative in 
their pleaded allegations, as there is no robust approach to scrutinise such evidence except 
with reference to other pleaded allegations. These of course might also lack veracity. 
Because such disputes must be resolved quickly without the benefit of time, or hearing 
from the witness orally or being able to cross-examine them, it is incredibly difficult (if not 
impossible) to assess the credibility of what the deponents are saying, or otherwise resolve 
the controversy.119  
 
The benefits of “live evidence”120 and cross-examination121 have been called into serious 
question by recent studies and judicial decisions.122 A number of failings are argued. For 
example with oral evidence Bond and Depaulo note, “the average person discriminates 
[through visual demeanour] lies from truths at a level slightly better than he or she could 
achieve by flipping a coin”.123 With regards to cross-examination it is said that, rather than 
being “…the servant of truth”,124 it results in otherwise truthful or reliable witnesses being 
                                                        
114 Keller v Keller, above n 90, at [17], Mankletow v Public Trustee, above n 96, at [2], [12], Dodd v Jones, 
above n  82, at [25]-[26].  
115 Doherty v Doherty, above n 102, at [4], Dodd v Jones, above n 82, at [28], Reece v Little, above n 31, at 
[67]-[69], Meier v Bell, above n 82, at 3, Mankletow v Public Trustee, above n  96, at [5], Jones v Dodd, 
above n 82, at [14]-[15], Ugle v Bowra, above n 88, at [14].  
116 Dodd v Jones, above n 82, at [9]-[11], Reece v Little, above n 31, at [24]-[37], Meier v Bell, above n 82, at 
2,  Mourish v Wynne, above n 90, at [6]-[10], [45], Mankletow v Public Trustee, above n  96, at [2], [21], 
Jones v Dodd, above n 82, at [9]-[10], [13], Doherty v Doherty, above n 102, at [2], [6], [9], Burrows v 
Cramley, above n 102, at [1], [5], Ugle v Bowra, above n 88, at [9].  
117 Dow v Hoskins, above n 113, at [38], Dodd v Jones, above n 82, at [16], Reece v Little, above n 31, at 
[38], [71]-[74], Meier v Bell, above n 82, at 3, Mankletow v Public Trustee, above n  96, at [12], Jones v 
Dodd, above n 82, at [14], [16]-[17], [25], Mourish v Wynee, above n 90, at [37], Doherty v Doherty, above n 
102, at [3]-[4], [10]-[12], Burrows v Cramley, above n 102, at [30], Keller v Keller, above n 90, at [3], Ugle v 
Bowra, above n 88, at [10].  
118 Takamore v Clarke (SC), above n 1, at [11].  
119 Ugle v Bowra, above n 88, at [1], [4].  
120 Evidence Act 2006, s 83. See Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman Criminal Evidence (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 292.  
121 Evidence Act 2006, s 4 definition of “leading question”.  
122 Elisabeth McDonald Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases (Wellington, Thomson Reuters, 2012) at 
60-61, 84-85, 130-133.  
123 Charles Bond and Bello DePaulo “Accuracy of Deception Judgments” (2006) 10 Personality and Social 
Psychology Review 214 at 299. See also Sigfried L Sporer and Barbera Schwandt “Moderators of Non-
Verbal Indicators of Deception: A Meta-Analytic Synthesis” (2007) 13 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 
1.  
124 Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, above n 120, at 296.  
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made to look deceitful because they are outmanoeuvred by the artful questioning 
lawyer.125  
 
It might be argued that, even assuming burial disputes had the luxury of time on their side, 
subjecting them to requirements of orality and cross-examination will not necessarily lead 
to Court’s successfully resolving factual disputes. Independent of these studies, at the 
“coal-face” of practice of civil litigation there is still a perceived need for cross-
examination and orality.126 And this is reflected in the law as it currently exists; for 
example the inability to cross-examine is seen as an important consideration against 
admissibility of hearsay,127 and is encapsulated in the minimum standards of due process 
for criminal trials.128 Such primacy points to the conclusion that our current institutional 
framework for the resolution of disputes deems cross-examination and orality to be a 
reliable method of assessing the credibility of witnesses.  It should also be conceded that to 
fully resolve a factual dispute, time is necessary.129 For parties to fully prepare their cases 
all relevant documentary evidence, and witnesses (especially third parties) needs to be 
gathered, and this allows evidentiary matters and disputes to be fully developed and 
resolved by the Court. Consequently, even in light of recent studies which call into 
question the efficacy of orality and cross-examination, time is still the real enemy of the 
just resolution of factual disputes in burial cases.130 This will be illustrated later, with 
reference to the facts of the present case.  
 
Judges resolving burial disputes are placed in a serious predicament; the contested 
evidence can be highly relevant or even determinative, but where faced with two disparate 
views of what happened, how do they determine what the truth is? A judge might choose 
to make a calculated guess as to what actually happened, and this has happened in a 
number of Australian decisions.131 The risk with this is that the judge gets it wrong; and 
                                                        
125 Ibid.  
126 R v L [1994] 2 NZLR 54 (CA) at 61.  
127 Richard Mahoney and others The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2010) at 74, R v L, above n 126, at 63, R v Aekins DC Auckland CRI-2006-004-13245, 16 August 2007 at 
[50].  
128 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(f).  
129 Ugle v Bowra, above n 88, at [1], Dow v Hoskins, above n 113, at [18], 
130 Brian L Josias “Burying the Hatchet in Burial Disputes: Applying Alternative Dispute Resolution to 
Disputes Concerning the Interment of Bodies” (2003-2004) 79 Notre Dame L Rev 1141 at 1154.  
131 Dow v Hoskins, above n 128, at [34], Mankletow v Public Trustee, above n  96, at [5], [29]-[30], Dodd v 
Jones, above n 82, at [25], Mourish v Wynee, above n 90, at [34], Leeburn v Derndeorfer, above n 96, at 
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this undermines any claim that the dispute was resolved in accordance with its merits. And 
such findings of facts do a serious injustice to the party whom they are made against 
(contrary to the entire purpose of a merits-based test).  
 
Alternatively, a judge might also choose to not determine the controversy and avoid 
making a dispositive finding of fact, and resolve the dispute considering other factors. This 
has also occurred in a number of Australian decisions.132 But this ultimately undermines 
the entire purpose of a merits-based test, the just resolution of burial disputes based on the 
entire circumstances of the case. One cannot resolve a dispute justly by ignoring one of the 
factual issues that properly bears on the resolution of the matter, as the unresolved fact 
may have resulted in a different outcome. Either the judge is forced resolve the debate 
based on contradictory evidence with no means (or time) to adequately do so, or they 
ignore relevant (but contradictory evidence) and otherwise attempt to resolve the dispute 
on uncontroverted facts. Equally unpalatable as the above scenario, the outcome is the 
resolution of the dispute expressly at odds with the underlying policy rationale of the 
applicable legal test. 
 
In Takamore, the key feature which influenced the move towards a prescriptive test  when 
resolving burial disputes in Australia was absent; the need for a speedy burial.133 The 
consequences of this can be clearly seen where the Supreme Court felt it was in a position 
to determine that the deceased had not turned his back on his cultural beliefs.134 The 
Supreme Court had the benefit of reviewing the evidence of all relevant witnesses to 
whom the deceased had expressed his views on his Māori heritage, including the 
countervailing evidence of his mother,135 and expert witnesses on the urbanisation of 
Māori.136 Even more crucial, the Court had a considerable period of time to consider the 
ramifications of the evidence and take a more robust approach when scrutinising it.137 This 
ultimately led to the Court’s concluding that the inference drawn in the High Court (that 
                                                        
132 Dodd v Jones, above n 82, at [28], Jones v Dodd, above n 82, at [18], [25], Mourish v Wynee, above n 90, 
at [12], [16], [40], Doherty v Doherty, above n 102, at [14], Leeburn v Derndeorfer, above n 96, at [2], [4], 
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135 Clarke v Takamore (HC), above n 3, at [15], Takamore v Clarke (CA), above n 3, at [160].  
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the deceased had turned his back on his tribal roots and tikanga),138 was unmerited, 
because the deceased may have said different things to different people about his views on 
his Māori heritage (to please them).139 In this context, it was ironic for the Chief Justice to 
dismiss the difficulties of resolving factual controversies under a merits-based approach, 
when she had the luxury of time on her side. The way in which tikanga was dealt with in 
this case also provides a useful illustration of another issue that arises in the application of 
a merits-based test, that is arbitrary marginalisation of relevant factors.  
D Balancing Competing Factors  
 
The second area of difficulty in applying a merits-based test is weighing competing factors 
to determine which claimant should be allowed to resolve the issue of burial. This is not so 
much a corollary of the need to ensure expeditious burial, but the difficulties of balancing 
competing . Though not necessarily a novel issue faced by the judiciary,140 a unique 
feature in the case of the burial disputes is the absence of a clear legal framework which 
offers guidance when weighing up the competing factors. The position can be readily 
contrasted to say, an application for security of costs.141 The relevant Court rules and cases 
prescribes a clear legal framework through which it is possible to cogently balance 
competing factors when determining whether security should be required.142  
 
The position is quite different in case of burial disputes. The issue was expressed concisely 
by Doyle CJ in the Australian Supreme Court decision in Dodd v Jones:143 
 
“Sadly, the problem before me is really insoluble in one sense. It is impossible in 
any realistic sense to weigh the competing claims and arrive at what one would 
call a legal judgment.”    
 
Three features of burial disputes make it difficult to balance the competing claims of the 
parties under a merits-based test. Firstly burial disputes involve the consideration of a wide 
                                                        
138 Clarke v Takamore (HC), above n 3, at [71].  
139 Takamore v Clarke (CA), above n 3, at [161].  
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142 Andrew Beck, above n 48, at 174, A S McLachlan Ltd v MEL Network Ltd (2002) 16 PRNZ 747 (CA) at 
[15]-[16], Bell-Booth Group Ltd v Attorney-General (1986) 1 PRNZ 457 (HC) at 16, Highgate on Broadway 
Ltd v Devine [2012] NZHC 2288 at [23].  
143 Jones v Dodd, above n 82, at [36].  
23 
 
variety of disparate factors.144 Secondly such factors are not readily comparable in the 
sense that they will often be equally important.145 Thirdly, the win/lose nature of burial 
disputes requires the judge to make a decision, the inability to compromise meaning one 
party must undeservingly lose out.146 The result is that judges are forced to attempt to 
unconvincingly resolve burial disputes in accordance with their supposed merits, when in 
reality both parties have equally meritorious claims. In many cases the underlying 
assumption of a merits-based approach is incorrect; there is no normatively correct 
outcome, only the pressing need for a decision to be made.147 The judiciary are forced to 
arbitrarily undermine particular factors so as to give the appearance of a cogent “legal 
judgment”. However as identified by Doyle CJ in Dodd, aspiring to such a standard of 
legal reasoning is a fallacy in the context of burial disputes, because there is often no one 
“right” answer. Examples of these scenarios from Australian cases and Takamore will be 
discussed below. The ultimate results are ad hoc and unfair, which only goes to further 
highlight the failings of a merits-based approach.  
 
The spurious attempts of some judges to marginalise particular factors is only natural; the 
alternative is to admit that burial disputes are often so finely balanced that it is impossible 
to resolve them fairly. In Takamore, the Chief Justice goes to great lengths to stress the 
importance of tikanga when resolving burial disputes, so much so, that it was one of the 
key reasons she rejected a prescriptive approach.148 Her ultimate conclusion is then 
somewhat surprising, that the appellants claim (supported by tikanga) was outweighed by 
that of the respondents because of the deceased’s original decision to follow the 
respondent when she moved to Christchurch.149 In an attempt to provide a more sound 
explanation (in light of the earlier primacy given to tikanga), the Judge marginalises 
tikanga (and the support it offered the appellants claim) by stating that “... resolution by 
the Court of the present dispute does not preclude reconciliation in accordance with 
tikanga for the future.”150 Her argument appears to be that, though the appellant (and her 
                                                        
144 See cases in Footnotes 114-117.  
145 Dodd v Jones, above n 82, at [29], [36], Burrows v Cramley, above n 102, at [36], Keller v Keller, above n 
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wider kin group) have lost in the present case, future claims based on tikanga may well 
succeed. The present result (dismissing those beliefs as being less important than the 
respondent’s relationship with the deceased and his life choices) is then justified.  
 
This argument is unpersuasive for a number of reasons. Firstly it would appear to be 
inconsistent with precedent; essentially two litigated burial disputes have occurred in New 
Zealand during the last century, it is highly unlikely any future burial disputes will arise 
for this to occur.151 Secondly this pre-empts the resolution of future claims, the present 
claimants culture beliefs are abruptly dismissed by the Chief Justice for the promise that 
they may be recognised in future cases. But-under-a merits-based test, such an outcome is 
hardly guaranteed; the infinite factual circumstances present-in the lives of New 
Zealanders would indicate that their will almost always be countervailing factors present to 
challenge cultural claims. Thirdly, it is difficult to rationalise why the fact future claims 
supported by tikanga might be upheld (and which would be resolved on their own facts), 
should be relevant to the dismissal of the present one, as once again, each case will turn on 
its own facts. To the extent such a line was a throwaway one, the Chief Justice’s attempts 
to salve what appears to be a guilty conscience only goes to demonstrate her apparent 
difficulty in balancing the present claims.  
 
Neither is this an isolated example.152 In Dodd v Jones, Doyle CJ is unable to reconcile the 
competing-cultural-claims-of the deceased’s father, and the contrasting claims of the 
deceased’s-close de-facto partner.153 However, because-the-dispute-has to be resolved, the 
Judge prefers the claim of-the deceased’s de facto partner because she would have been 
entitled to the grant of letters of administration.154 Because her claim was supported by the 
common law (but the father’s cultural claim was not) hers was to be preferred. It is 
difficult to see why the fact the-partners claim in this case was supported by the common 
law (enshrined in the High Court Rules in New Zealand)155 justified-an-outcome in her 
favour. This-is-inconsistent with a merits-based\-approach-because-the common law 
appoints an administrator-in-accordance-with a-hierarchy-of-those-with a beneficial 
interest in the deceased’s estate, rather-than the person who seems to have the strongest 
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claim to decide where-the deceased should be buried (with reference to the wider 
circumstances of the dispute).156 This demonstrates that such disputes are often so finely 
balanced that to resolve them solely based on their merits is not possible, and recourse to 
practical considerations (such a where the body is located or which party has the most 
advanced funeral preparations) are necessary.157 This calls into question the need (or 
efficacy) of merits-based approach. The poignant question becomes, what is the 
alternative? 
IV Conclusion and Reform  
A The Injustice of a Merits-Based Approach 
 
Merits-based-resolution-has-been-advocated-for time and time again in cases because it 
appears unpalatable to members of the judiciary-that-disputes are resolved other than in 
accordance with their merits.158 The need to speedily resolve burial disputes and-the 
difficulty of weighing competing factors relevant to such claims, means that a merits-
based-test-does-not-result-in-just-decisions. The result is that the overriding policy-
considerations-in-favour-of-such-an-approach falls away. To the extent this appears to be a 
generalisation, it is argued that it is illustrative of what would happen in the majority of 
cases. In decisions of such importance to the parties and society at large, the law should 
deal in realities rather than create a rule catering to exceptional cases which are relatively 
clear-cut.  
 
The-resolution of disputes of such monument other than in accordance with their merits 
might seem distasteful.159 This is especially so when fundamental values such as spiritual 
and cultural beliefs are at stake. The relevance of human rights in the context of burial 
disputes only highlights the inadequacies of judicial involvement, exemplifying their 
                                                        
156 At [74].  
157 Takamore v Clarke (SC), above n 1, at [77]. Mankletow v Public Trustee, above n  96, at [29]-[30], Jones 
v Dodd, above n 82, at [55], [64]-[65], Mourish v Wynee, above n 90, at [42]-[43], Burrows v Cramley, 
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inability coherently and correctly balance conflicting rights.160 Contrasting judicial opinion 
about the role of the Courts only goes to further show that Judges themselves are aware 
that the fair resolution of burial disputes may not be possible.161 The role of the Court in 
burial disputes need not be a negative one; the judiciary are well placed to carry out a 
supervisory role applying a prescriptive approach, which could act as the necessary 
backstop where disputes cannot be resolved inter-parties.  
B Reform  
 
The role of the Court as ultimate arbiter can be obviated with every effort being made to 
resolve the dispute through institutionally-backed ADR.  A recurring theme in Takamore 
(or lack thereof) is the sheer lack of case-law-in-New-Zealand-in terms of burial 
disputes.162 Happily, those-few-cases-which-fall-through the cracks of amicable inter-
parties resolution might yet be saved-from the battering process of litigation through a 
mandatory requirement that parties attend-mediation before going to Court.163 This might 
be analogous in form to mandatory mediation in the employment law context,164 and could 
be tacked onto to an existing government funded mediation services to save costs (the 
number of burial disputes in New Zealand would not justify the creation of an additional 
mediation service).  
 
The advantages of mediation over litigation in this context would include the flexibility 
offered in process and outcome, empowering the parties to resolve the dispute as they 
choose, and thereby mitigating the win/lose nature of burial disputes under a Court 
orientated process. Such a process allows for the parties to have their own beliefs and 
values heard and recognised,165 and mediation-is also-recognised-as being eminently 
suited to cross-cultural disputes, as well-as-resonating-with-cultural-dispute-resolution 
processes.166 Disadvantages-such-as loss-of-precedential-value are arguably moot, as the 
                                                        
160 See [91]-[108] for the Chief Justices balancing exercise in resolving the dispute, compare with the 
majority’s approach at [165]-[170], and compare Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act: a commentary (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) at 124-127.  
161 Heather Conway “Dead, but not Buried: Bodies, Burial and Family Conflicts” (2003) LS 423 at 430.  
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163 Peter Spiller, above n 140, at 22. Brian L Josias above n 130, at 1116. 
164 Employment Relations Act 2000, ss 159, 188. Peter Spiller, above n 140, at 236.  
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166 Yvonne Oldsfield “Disputes Over Internment and Cremation: the Mediation Option” (LLM Research 
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highly personal nature-of-such disputes means they essentially turn on their own facts. 
Other practical benefits would-include-speedier resolution, less-expense, and the 
preservation or transformation of relationships.167 The last point is key, many burial 
disputes will be a manifestation of underlying breakdown in the party’s relationships rather 
than a genuine controversy about where the deceased should be buried.168 Courts are ill-
suited to resolve deep-seated familial feuds.169 Justice is arguably best served by the law 
providing the parties with the tools to resolve the dispute themselves, and perhaps 
relationship issues as well.   
 
However neither is mediation a perfect fit. A number of issues arise. Firstly mandatory 
mediation in itself is disempowering to the parties; as it is non-consensual. However as 
Peter Spiller notes, consent in this context is focused on outcome rather than entry.170 The 
outcome must still voluntarily be agreed to. Evidence from other statutory regimes which 
impose mandatory mediation demonstrate that their involuntary nature does not undermine 
effectiveness in terms of resolving disputes.171  
 
Another issue is the relationship between mandatory mediation and the Court (as ultimate 
back-stop) in terms of the way it resolves burial disputes. It might be argued that if a 
prescriptive approach is applied by the Court, this could incentivise the party who is 
ultimately entitled under such a regime to refuse to co-operate during the mediation 
process, because they get to decide where to bury the deceased if the matter goes to Court. 
A tenable solution could be to impose a positive obligation on the parties to approach 
mediation in good faith, breach of which would allow the Court to alter the order of 
priority under the prescriptive regime. This would act as a deterrent to the entitled party 
seeking to undermine the mediation process merely because they are entitled to decide 
under the prescriptive regime (which is only in place because of the need to ensure the 
deceased is buried where the parties cannot agree). Such a solution is not in itself without 
difficulties, as the nature of such an obligation (and what entailed a breach) would have to 
                                                        
167 Brian L Josias, above n 130, at 1176.  
168 Heather Conway and John Stannard “The Honours of Hades: Death, Emotion and the Law of Burial 
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be defined. However it is worth considering and draws support from commentators who 
argue for the imposition of a similar duty in the context of ethics and negotiation.172  
 
The final issue is the need for early intervention in burial disputes.173 This is demonstrated 
by the facts of the present case; lack of amicable intervention prior to the uplifting of the 
deceased’s remains resulted in a raw, intractable, and very public burial dispute.174 
Numerous attempts at mediation or negotiation between the parties failed over the five 
years of litigation.175 The key issue in this context was mediator-led intervention needed to 
occur prior to the stage where attitudes hardened and bitterness became entrenched 
between the parties, especially before the Kutarere family uplifted the deceased’s body. 
Any reform would therefore need to be coupled with a public awareness campaign to 
ensure New Zealanders were aware of mediation services.  
 
In terms of litigation as the “default option”176 there are multiple ways in which Court 
review might be carried out, depending on whether this is done with reference to a first 
decider or unilateral arrangements made by one the parties.177 Insofar as out of Court 
resolution is not possible, a tentative alternative to a merits-based approach could be a 
prescriptive approach, via the hard form of a decider rule,178 perhaps reflected in a 
statutory regime which outlines a priority of decision-makers (as has been done in British 
Columbia).179 Legislative reform would additionally allow a full consideration of all the 
policy issues at play, something not possible if burial disputes were to be resolved solely 
via judge-made law.180 Reform would focus on establishing a regime which resolves the 
dispute outside of Court, providing a cheap, speedy, and practical solution to a dispute that 
must be resolved.181 This is positively desirable, the alternative default option is litigation 
under a merits-based approach, with the associated costs, damage to relationships, time-
                                                        
172 D W McLauchlan “The Agreement to Negotiate in Good Faith: A Non-Justiciable Contract?” (2005) 11 
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delays, disempowerment, and limits as to remedies making it as less than attractive option 
for parties and society generally.182  
 
In this context the words of Martin J that “A legal solution [to burial disputes] must be 
found...” should be borne in mind. Not all disputes can be resolved through agreement; 
therefore the law must have a solution, and this where the Court comes in. Australia’s 
lesson has been that the judicial application of a merits-based test does not produce the 
kinds of outcomes it seeks provide. The real injustice in the entire Takamore saga would 
be to not learn from this.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
182 Peter Spiller, above 140, at 22, Brian L Josias, above n 130, at 1166.  
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